

# Grounds for the Patagonia Without Dams Campaign

Baker River, Aysén Region - Chilean Patagonia



ECOSISTEMAS



General Carrera/Chelkeno Lake at the source of the Baker River, Aysén Region Chilean Patagonia

Chile faces today a serious socio-environmental conflict with multiple ramifications around the conservation of Chilean Patagonia or the building of large hydroelectric dams in this unique territory. On the one hand, the Chilean Government, through the Environmental Evaluation Commission of the Aysén Region, has authorized the building of 5 hydroelectric dams of the HidroAysén Project (HAP) in the Baker and Pascua rivers, while, on the other hand, more than 60% of the country's population consistently rejects this initiative, which is perceived as environmentally, socially and economically harmful for Chile, and as the potential beginning of the degradation of this precious southern bioregion by an energy-wise unnecessary project.

Chilean Patagonia is a unique ecosystem mosaic with high rates of biodiversity and endemism. Its unique landscapes are an extraordinary and priceless natural capital. Patagonia, which has been proposed to UNESCO for Natural World Heritage status, boasts one of the world's major freshwater reserves, and is home to a culture rich in identity. Local people aspire at developing the region's potential on the basis of conserving its natural resources and territorial integrity. Patagonia's tourism potential, which relies on its exceptional environmental attributes, would be seriously and irreversibly damaged by HA.

The "Patagonia Defense Council" ("Consejo de Defensa de la Patagonia - CDP") is a growing coalition, comprised of 80 organizations from Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Spain and Italy who have taken on the mission of protecting the environmental integrity of Chilean Patagonia, gravely threatened by the HAP and its associated transmission lines. For five years now, the CDP has been articulating a campaign called "Patagonia Sin Represas" ("Patagonia Without Dams") at the local, national, and international levels.

Enel, the Italian energy giant, which controls Endesa/Spain/Chile, is currently in charge of deciding about HA. The wrong reason driving the HAP is that Endesa captured massive water rights in Chile's southern rivers. Since February 2009, both the HAP as well as these water rights are Enel's responsibility, so that its management should seriously consider the devastating environmental impacts that the exercise of these water rights would provoke, and that they were privatized in a highly questionable manner in 1989, last year of the military dictatorship (1973-1990). This transaction took place at zero cost to the companies and in total absence of a democratic process.

## The HidroAysén Project

a) **Generation component:** 5 hydroelectric plants, two in the Baker River and three in the Pascua River (2,750 MW; 18,000 GWh/yr; 14,604 acres flooding area); estimated cost: US\$ 6,000 M.; project developed by the HidroAysén company, a joint venture 51% owned by Endesa-Chile (a subsidiary of Endesa-Spain, of which Enel retains a 92% control) and 49% owned by Chilean company Colbún.

On August 2008, HA submitted to the Environmental Evaluation Commission (CEA in Spanish) of the Aysén Region, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) exclusively of the 5 dams (generation component), which was authorized by the CEA of Aysén on May 9th, 2011. On June 9th, 2011, CDP's lawyers presented 7 legal injunctions demanding the annulment of the favourable Environmental Qualification Resolution of the generation component of the HAP, due to the illegalities and irregularities which have plagued the procedure. The injunction was admitted to process by the Appeals Court in Puerto Montt, which placed a 'no innovation' order, thus momentarily paralyzing the administrative procedure of the HAP. On October 6, 2011, the Appeals Court, in a divided sentence -two to one- rejected the 7 injunctions presented by CDP's lawyers, who appealed to the Supreme Court in Santiago.

On April 4, 2012, the Supreme Court, again in a divided sentence -three to two- rejected CDP's injunctions. It is worth noting that both divided sentences do not mean minor discrepancies between the Ministers, or nuances in the interpretation of the law, but that in both cases the sentences of the dissident Ministers (ruling in favour of CDP's injunctions) are totally contradictory regarding the sentences of the Minister rejecting the injunctions. The sentences of the two dissident Ministers of the Supreme Court are particularly striking because they declare that the authorization of the HAP is illegal since the project was authorized on the basis of 'future conditionings' regarding evaluations about the HAP's most critical and risky aspects, which supposedly the company would realize after the authorization. The two dissident Ministers point out that these future conditionings do not exist in the environmental law, and that

they violate its fundamental preventive principle, since the studies mentioned should have been done during the EIA procedure and could have determined that the project is unviable.

The Ministers Committee of the Environmental Ministry in Santiago now has to emit a final verdict regarding the reclamations that have been made by different parties, including the HidroAysén consortium itself, which claims that the conditions imposed are too harsh. There is no dead-line for the meeting of the Ministers Committee.

During eleven months, from June 2011 to April 2012, a special Human Rights Commission of the Lower Chamber of the Chilean Parliament investigated the irregularities around the EIA procedure of the HAP. The investigation included a field-trip to Aysén, and hearings with persons involved in the process, including public officers of Aysén's regional Government whose critical observations regarding the HAP were censored, edited, or eliminated. The Commission concluded that the HAP should never have been admitted to evaluation on the basis of the extremely incomplete EIA presented by HidroAysén.

<http://www.camara.cl/pdf.aspx?prmid=3120&prmtipo=SOBRETABLA>

The whole [evaluation] procedure of the HAP is vitiated since its beginning, reason why it should never have even presented to the Environmental Impact Assessment System." Human Rights Investigative Commission of the Lower Chamber of the Chilean Parliament, January 2012.

b) **Transmission component:** a 1,180 mile high-voltage direct-current transmission line; 6,000 towers measuring between 131 to 196 feet high; 34,594 acres clear-cut for the line's 229 feet-wide service lane; estimated cost: US\$ 6,000 M. Until today no official public information regarding the transmission component of the HAP has been available. According to the information presented in HA's EIA, 100% of the electricity generated would be transported through the 1,180 miles-long line to be downloaded into the SIC (Central Interconnected System) at the south-west periphery of Santiago's Metropolitan

Region. Clearly, the main targets of this electrical business are industries around Santiago, and particularly mining operations north of Chile's capital. None of the eight regions crossed by this transmission line would receive any of the electricity produced by the HAP. On June 2012, Colbún, the minority partner of the HA consortium, paralyzes the environmental impact evaluation of the line, informing the authority that "as long as a national energy policy with ample support which establishes the guidelines for the energy matrix the country requires does not exist, Colbún estimates that the conditions are not given to develop energy projects of this magnitude and complexity."

The estimated cost of both components of the HAP –generation and transmission-has practically tripled since the first announcements of the project six years ago. Officers of the companies involved, and independent analysts, have declared that the estimated cost of the project as a whole -generation plus transmission- could reach USD 11 B, particularly due to the increase of the estimated cost of the transmission line. This uncertainty regarding the eventual cost of the HAP increases significantly the financial risk of the project.

#### HidroAysén's High Risks

a) Patagonia is a fragile, unstable region crossed by important geological faults. On 21 April 2007, the region was hit by an earthquake 6.2° Richter and a tsunami, after which Aysén was declared a "seismic Region". Nevertheless, neither this situation, nor reservoir induced seismicity were taken into account in the EIA.

b) On May 1, 2008, the Chaitén volcano erupted in Chile's northern Patagonia. This volcanic event would have destroyed an important stretch of the transmission line associated to HA, causing an extremely grave energy crisis in the SIC, with the sudden loss of HA's 2,750 MW for an undetermined period of time.

c) In Patagonia's basins, where the dams are being planned, glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) have been occurring with an unprecedented recurrence rate. Ten GLOFs directly related to climate change and the melting of the glaciers hit the Baker River basin in the last four years, directly within the influence area of one of the projected dams, producing large rises in water levels and flow rates in the river, flooding farmland, causing loss of cattle and affecting road infrastructure; this aspect was not evaluated properly in the EIA.



Demonstrations against the HidroAysén project  
Santiago - Chile  
May, 2011



Majestic flight of the  
Cóndor  
Aysén Region

[www.ecosistemas.cl](http://www.ecosistemas.cl)

d) There are growing security concerns about large dams worldwide. The world's 50,000 large dams were built without considering the erratic hydrology that is being caused by climate change; today, most of them should be considered liabilities.

With earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and GLOFs, the HA dams could put at risk the life of the population living downstream from the dams, and install a high risk of power shortages within the SIC grid (running through most of the continental interconnected Chilean territory, supplying 93% of Chile's population), due to the high probability of failures in HA's hydroelectric power stations and transmission lines. It is worth mentioning the total, four-hour collapse of the SIC grid which occurred on 14th March, 2010, and caused, consequently, a black-out that affected 93% of Chile's population. According to Transelec (owner of the transmission system), this was due to the late failure of one transformer that had been damaged by the 8.8° Richter earthquake of February 27th, 2010.

e) If HA is imposed on Chile's population through sheer corporate and political lobbying, it will carry an extremely high social risk. Five major hydroelectric dams built in a remote but much cherished part of Chile, and a 1,180-mile long transmission line crossing 8 regions, 67 counties, 17 Parks and Natural Reserves, 32 private protected areas, 26 priority conservation sites for biodiversity, 26 wetlands, as well as thousands of properties -including lands of indigenous Mapuche communities, would be extremely vulnerable to the human/social unrest factor.

#### Flawed Environmental Governance System

During the last two periods, Chilean governments have been debating and implementing radical changes in environmental governance and laws. This results from a transversal negative assessment of the system that has been in place since 1994, under which HA's EIA started, where decision-making is not democratic, political rather than technical, and disproportionately influenced by project promoters. Chilean legislation does not consider citizen's participation, and the opinion of the population most directly affected by large projects, something particularly shocking around one such as HA, which through its generation and transmission components would impact thousands of persons and their properties. Problems in environmental governance are leading to

serious governance issues in general, and to a loss of confidence in the establishment by citizens. The radical modification of the environmental governance system, and the implementation of the Environment Ministry is still underway, also surrounded by public controversy.

#### Incomplete Assessment

Obviously, the generation and transmission components of a major hydroelectric project are inseparable parts of a whole. In Chile, due to the serious shortcomings of environmental legislation, each component can be assessed separately. Thus, the impact of the HAP -sum and synergy of the impacts of the generation and transmission components- has not been properly assessed. The development of the generation component independently from the transmission component is creating a legal oddity, which carries high risks for the proponents of the HAP, while it also generates a perverse incentive for the authorization of the transmission line.

The severe inconsistencies and flaws of Chile's environmental legislation and other related laws, norms and regulations, also become evident by the fact that they permit a mega hydroelectric project such as HA to enter the process of environmental evaluation despite the fact that the companies involved do not have the specific water rights for the hydroelectric dams presented to evaluation. Indeed, Endesa -the Italian-Spanish-Chilean company in the HidroAysén society which holds a quasi monopoly of non-consumptive water rights in Chile<sup>1</sup> - holds water rights for hydroelectric dams in the Baker and Pascua rivers

[1] Chile 1981 Water Code – Article 14: "A non-consumptive user right permits to use water without consuming it and obliges to reconstitute it in the form determined by the act of acquisition or constitution of the right. The extraction or restitution of the waters will always be done in a way that does not harm the rights of third parties constituted over the same waters, in terms of its quantity, quality, substance, use opportunity and other characteristics." **Authors' note:** Non consumptive water rights, specific for hydroelectric development, were created in the 1981 Water Code promulgated during Pinochet's dictatorship. The nomenclature 'non- consumptive' is deceiving, because 'to use without consuming' sounds as something beneficial, even ecological. In practice, though, when companies such as Endesa have massive non consumptive water rights in a river, they grant the company a monopoly of the use of the water course, making it impossible for third parties to register rights in the same river (and draw water from it), under the argument that 'their' water could eventually not be there when attempting to put it to use. Furthermore, these rights make possible the building of large hydroelectric dams, so that in practice they permit the massive occupation and severe degradation of hydrological basins.

which were registered in the '80s and early '90s, with which Endesa which could theoretically flood 81,544 acres. This corresponds to Endesa's original hydroelectric scheme -dating from the '40s- projected to be built in the rivers of the Aysén Region.

The actual HAP presented to evaluation consists of five hydro dams which, according to the companies' information, would flood 14,604 acres. HA still does not have the water rights for these five dams which, notwithstanding, were authorized by the Environmental Evaluation Commission of the Aysén Region. This situation shows to what extent sectorial legislations in Chile operate in separate, parallel tracks, and thus makes possible that an enterprise such as HA can gradually achieve the authorization of a large and controversial project by parts, generating in this way a perverse systemic incentive for the posterior authorization of the following components. It is evident that HA has run the risk of presenting to evaluation an incomplete project, which, in this case, lacks the specific water rights, because it has, or thinks it has, the certainty that the authority is going to solve the problem for them at some point along the evaluation process. In fact, in July 2010, the General Water Directorate issued the Resolution 1,800, which was designed ad hoc to solve HA's water rights problem, apparently insoluble until the issue of this resolution.

CDP's lawyers made a legal presentation before the General Comptrollers Office (GCO) to challenge the legality of Resolution 1,800 - 2010, with which abruptly, and via an administrative resolution, the government pretended to modify, as a matter of fact, Chile's 1981 Water Code, and to radically change the historical criteria of the General Water Directorate in the matter. On August 1st, the GCO dictated that *"it has had to abstain from authorizing the resolution n° 14 -2011 of the General Water Directorate of the Aysén Region, by which were constituted non-consumptive user water rights over superficial and running waters in favour of "Centrales Hidroeléctricas de Aysén S.A."* This resolution of the GCO annuls the increase of water rights requested by HA, which is indispensable for the construction of the HAP. This installs another significant legal obstacle for the realization of HA.

Up to date the consortium does not have the water rights necessary for the implementation of the project.


### Violation of International Treaty

On June 12th, 2008, CDP's lawyers submitted a claim before the Canada-Chile Commission for Environmental Cooperation in Ottawa, calling for the enforcement of the 1991 Environmental Treaty<sup>2</sup> between Chile and Argentina, and reporting "a persistent pattern of non-compliance of sector-specific legislation on the part of the Chilean State". The Chilean government granted Endesa a provisional electricity concession to carry out studies for hydroelectric projects in Aysén without considering the Additional Specific Protocol on Shared Water Resources contained in the treaty mentioned above, which requires "general plans for the utilization of shared watersheds" before any intervention on bi-national basins. These plans do not exist and an EIA for the damming of the Baker and the Pascua rivers has been processed, in clear violation of the Protocol given that both basins are shared water resources. This situation might generate conflicts between Chile and Argentina, and even with Canada, since in the Canada-Chile Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, both parties agreed to abide by all their environmental obligations. On December 23d, 2008, the CDP was given leave to proceed by the Canadian Secretariat on the Chile-Canada Environmental Cooperation Agreement, which declared it would invite a Panel of Experts to start an enquiry, issue a request for information to Chile, and open a case file on the matter. Surprisingly, on October 2010, apparently after diplomatic pressure from Chile, the Secretariat summarily dismissed and closed the case arguing that Chile has not violated any internal legislation that could lead to damage in Patagonia.

### Water and Energy Monopoly

Endesa-Chile and Colbún concentrate 61% of power generation in the Central Interconnected System (SIC). If the HAP is built, these compa-

[2] The Environmental Treaty signed by Chile and Argentina in 1991 is an applicable national law in Chile; for this reason, it also became an enforceable rule specifically included in the Canada-Chile Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, which Chile and Canada signed in 1997 in association with the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) with the aim of promoting environmental development and cooperation. Therefore, the claim made by the CDP is fully in line with CCFTA objectives. The CCFTA also sets out a special procedure for "petitions concerning the implementation of environmental legislation", which can be initiated by any stakeholder or NGO.



Noel Vidal  
Baker River guide  
Aysén Region



Nef Glacier  
Aysén Region



panies would have monopoly control of close to 80% of power generation in the SIC grid, hindering competition in, and an effective state regulation of, the sector. The installation of HA's 2,750 MW, and the 18,000 GW/h/yr generated, would thwart the deployment of non-conventional renewable energy sources. Endesa-Chile also controls 80% of Chile's non-consumptive water rights, which rises to 96% in the Aysén region. This monopoly in the energy and water resources sectors leads to an excessive concentration of financial and social power, posing serious problems for democratic governance in Chile.

### Unnecessary Energy Project

A study conducted by independent energy experts (R. Román and S. Hall - April 2011 – <http://www.futurorenovable.cl>), focusing solely on the SIC grid --which covers 43% of the national territory, serving, as said, 93% of the country's population, and into which the energy generated by HA would be injected-- demonstrates that the data brandished by the private sector and governmental authorities to argue about the supposed need to duplicate Chile's installed capacity in the next ten years are biased, apparently to create the perception of energy crisis with the objective of promoting the lucrative electrical business. The distortion appears when growth of demand in Chile's northern grid, SING, is averaged with the growth of demand in the south-central SIC. Between 1993 and 2009 in the SING the capacity augmented in 929%, due to large mining operations which represent 85% of the demand in this system. During the same period, in the SIC, which really exposes the national tendencies, the capacity grew only 198%. Furthermore, between 2000 and 2010 in the SIC the average growth of demand was 3.9%, far from the 5.4% projected indefinitely by the private sector and government (as a reference: between 2001 and 2010 average GDP growth was 3.8%). According to these real numbers the duplication of capacity would be necessary only in 17 years (2028), and this projection does not consider neither the necessary increments in efficiency, or technological innovation.

Along the same line, according to Terram Foundation's research (About Electricity in Chile – May 2011- [www.terram.cl](http://www.terram.cl)) we can conclude that there will not be an energy shortage in Chile, at least during the next 13 years, even considering the private utilities' argument, which is echoed by the public sector, that Chile needs to install close to 1,000

MW per year during the next decade and more. An inflated, questionable projection in itself, according to independent consultants, precisely related to the inflated projections about growth of demand in Chile. In effect, between January 2007 and July 2010 the capacity of approved electrical projects -under construction and to be constructed- amounted to 9,985 MW. This amount doesn't incorporate projects which have been approved after July 2010, such as Patache (110 MW) and Pacifico (350 MW), with which the capacity rises to 10,625 MW additional to the actual installed capacity in Chile, this is 885 MW per year for the next 12 years. This last total doesn't incorporate another 3,925 MW of projects (excluding HidroAysén – 2,750 MW), which are still under environmental evaluation process.

Finally, according to the recent research "Chile Levelised Cost of Energy" ([www.nrdc.org/international/chilecostofenergy.asp](http://www.nrdc.org/international/chilecostofenergy.asp)) by Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Valgesta, and NRDC, in the year 2011, biogas, small hydro, biomass, geothermal and terrestrial-wind energies already are competitive sources of energy in relation to the actual construction cost of large hydroelectric and thermal plants using natural gas and coal. According to the study, by 2020, Concentrated Solar Power and photovoltaic will also be competitive, and by 2030 all non-conventional renewable sources of energy will be competitive, and even more economic than large scale conventional sources. The information generated by all these independent experts and consultants clearly demonstrates that Chile does not need HA to respond to the energy needs of its present and future development.

### Transnationals in Chile

In Chile, over the last few decades, Endesa and other corporations in the mining, forestry, and fishing sectors have gained negative reputations for imposing projects that have been designed without serious environmental considerations, which have been very poorly assessed, and which, consequently, have caused serious social, economic and environmental damages, and violated indigenous and human rights. The Chilean public has come to perceive these companies as taking advantage of

the ultra-neoliberal policies which were promulgated during the dictatorship (1973-1990) following Milton Friedman's (Chicago University) economic doctrine. Enel by taking control of Endesa-Chile without making any change of orientation -of operational directives-, has inherited Endesa's controversial legacy and bad image.

Furthermore, it should be considered that Enel's entry in Chile has already been tarnished by the negligent actions of the company Geotérmica del Norte, 51% owned by Enel, during geothermal exploratory work at its El Tatio concession, in the Antofagasta region, and by the conflict with indigenous Mapuche communities in Panguipulli, Lakes Region, around Enel's hydroelectric project, Neltume. In Europe, Enel publicizes its non-conventional renewable sources of energy portfolio, while in Chile it promotes an unnecessary and potentially destructive project such as HA, rejected by the majority of the Chilean people. In Chile Enel must contribute to bringing about a much needed and demanded change towards decentralised, distributed power generation systems based on Non-Conventional Renewable Sources of Energy and the highest standards in terms of the efficient use of energy, and energy policies genuinely oriented towards the common good, as well as social and environmental sustainability.

#### Some Milestones in the Opposition to HA

In November 2007, 120 residents of various localities of the Aysén Region rode on horseback for almost 200 miles to the region's capital to express their opposition to HA before the local authorities. In official surveys, Chilean people have voiced their rejection of HA. In April 2011, a survey conducted by IPSOS showed that 61.1% of the Chilean people opposed this major hydroelectric project in Patagonia. On May 15th the survey conducted by the "Centro de Encuestas de La Tercera" found that 74% oppose the HA project. More than 300,000 persons support the Patagonia Without Dams Campaign, though its web page ([www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl](http://www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl)), and several groups of Facebook and Twitter.

Since the authorization of the generation component of the HAP, Chilean people have massively protested along the country. Tens of thousands have marched to protest before the Government House, La Moneda, in downtown Santiago, with a peak of 100,000 persons on 2011. The "Patagonia Without Dams" campaign triggered a previously unprecedented social mobilization at a national level. The Chilean people have perceived the crude attempt at imposing the HAP as 'the drop that overflowed the glass', as an extreme expression of governmental authoritarianism, of the corporate lobby and power abuse which permeate and distort the system, endangering democracy, creating a serious governance crisis, somehow usurping the State, and practically excluding public participation in decision making.

Due to its transcendence, at the international level the campaign counts with the active support of organizations from Argentina, Bolivia, United States, Canada, Italy, Spain, Germany, and Belgium. After the authorization of the generation component of the HAP, and the public outcry it generated in Chile, many other persons in many countries are now supporting Patagonia Without Dams.

Chilean Governments have the obligation of safeguarding the common good of Chilean citizen's, including future generations. It is precisely for this reason that for several years now, through the Patagonia Without Dams campaign, the national and international community has been making a strong call to Chilean authorities, so that they do not to bend to the aggressive political lobby of the companies proponents of the HAP, and their media.

Citizens of the world will not permit that Patagonia becomes the booty of entrepreneurs who only pretend to profit from the natural force and life of Chile's magnificent southern rivers. This unique biogem must be protected and conserved as humanity's natural and cultural heritage.

Juan Pablo Orrego S.

Ecologist

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Magellanic Woodpecker,  
world's largest  
Aysén Region

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Mayo 2013



General Carrera/Chelenko Lake, Puerto Tranquilo Sector, Aysén Region

Patagonia Defense Council

- Agrupación de Defensores del Espíritu de la Patagonia
- Ancient Forest International - USA
- Associazione Studi America Latina- Italy
- Asociación Cultural Agraria- Spain
- Asociación Defensora de los Animales y la Naturaleza
- A Sud- Italy
- Cámara de Turismo de Río Tranquilo
- Centro de Documentación e Información- Bolivia
- Centro de Estudiantes Universidad Pedro de Valdivia
- Centro di Volontariato Internazionale - Italy
- Chile Sustentable
- CicloRecreoVia
- Coalición Ciudadana Aysén Reserva de Vida
- COAGRET- Spain
- CODEFF
- Comisión Brasileña Justicia y Paz
- Conservación Patagónica
- Corporación Chile Ambiente
- Corporación Costa Carrera
- Corporación de Desarrollo de Aysén
- Corporación Puelo Patagonia
- Corporación Kairos
- Coordinadora Nacional por la Defensa del Agua y la Vida
- Council of Canadians - Canadá
- Defendamos La Ciudad
- Diálogo Sustentable
- Ecoclúbes
- Ecologistas en Acción- Spain
- Ecosistemas
- Escuela Agroecológica de Pirque
- Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide- USA
- Escuela NOLS
- Escuela de Guías de la Patagonia
- Ética en los Bosques
- Fiscalía del Medio Ambiente
- Fondazione Culturale di Banca Etica-Italy
- Free Flowing Rivers – USA
- Fundación para la Defensa del Ambiente -Argentina
- Fundación Futaleufú Riverkeeper
- Fundación Melimoyu
- Fundación Oceana
- Fundación para la Tierra
- Fundación Pumalin
- Fundación Semilla
- Fundación Sociedades Sustentables
- Fundación Terram
- Fundación Vaino Auer - Argentina
- Fundación Yendegaia
- FutaFriends-USA
- Generando
- Geoaustral
- Global Response
- Greenpeace - Chile-Italy-Spain
- International Rivers - USA
- Innovación Eólica Cabrera
- Instituto de Ecología Política
- Instituto del Patrimonio Natural y Cultural
- Ingeniería Sin Fronteras- Spain
- Mani Tese-Italy
- Natural Resources Defense Council-USA
- Observatorio de Multinationales en América Latina – Paz con Dignidad-Spain
- Paz con Dignidad Madrid y País Vasco-Spain
- Probe International - Canadá
- Proyecto Lemu - Argentina
- Radio Encuentro
- Re: Common - Italy
- RENACE
- Servizio Civile Internazionale- Italy
- SETEM- Spain
- Verdeseo
- Vicariato Apostólico de Aysén
- Viuda de la Tierra
- WWF, Programa Ecoregión Valdiviana
- Xarxa per una Nova Cultura del Aigua- Spain

- Right Livelihood Award:**
- Chico Whitaker - Brasil 2006
- Helen Mack - Guatemala 1992
- Lara Lutzenberger - Brasil 1988
- Manfred Max Neef - Chile 1983
- Martin Almada - Paraguay 2002
- Martin von Hildebrand - Colombia 1999
- Raúl Montenegro - Argentina 2005

